Content and Form of Information Security

Mykola Filonov, civic activist, journalist

As Western analytical centers (in particular, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue) report, Moscow has significantly stepped up efforts to saturate the Internet and social networks with materials carrying its own narratives. These data then automatically enter the databases of chatbots and generative artificial intelligence systems.

As a result, without human intervention, AI itself will produce Kremlin messages and deliver them to users. Researchers emphasize that the Russian Federation is betting on the spread of fake news and disinformation, but the problem, it seems, is deeper.
So far, the only effective way to counter Russian propaganda is considered to be restricting it by blocking destructive channels and issuing refutations. However, you cannot put a supervisor on every large language model (LLM). And the ban on some information sources will immediately lead to the emergence of many others. Moreover, the spread of information viruses occurs not only by hacker means (though that also happens), but also in open, accessible and, most importantly, entirely legal networks.

There is no firm conviction yet as to how to counter this. And not only in Ukraine—it is enough to look at the mass of decisions by various governments on regulating the activities of Telegram and TikTok. However, one thing is clear—by tackling the problem at the level of form, Ukraine’s information security cannot be ensured. AI of this and the next generations will be able to bypass new prohibitions with ease.

Another aspect of this problem is that at present hostile propaganda is classified only as “fakes” and “disinformation.” Although, in fact, it is more appropriate to speak about behavior-modelling emphases—what is usually called “narratives.”
And they may be neither deceitful nor erroneous. Thus, in such a situation even technologically high-quality filtering of outright false information will not stop the hostile special operation.

There is only one way out—to generate our own content that is attractive for perception. And to disseminate it both to our own and to foreign audiences, including with the help of AI. With the ultimate goal of establishing the Ukrainian point of view in the mass consciousness.

For now, on the information front, Ukraine is in a tight defense. And there is little to boast of here—eight years after the ban on the Russian “VKontakte” and “Odnoklassniki,” a popular national social network has still not appeared.

However, wars are not won in defense. And if the authorities intend to step up work in this area, then very much must be changed: in the strategy of state information policy, in the methodology of its implementation, and in the institutional model that will ensure the fulfillment of tasks.